sandbox-operator

Security model

Trust boundaries

• The aggregated apiserver authenticates callers through standard Kubernetes authn/authz; access to agents.x-k8s.io resources is governed by RBAC. The e2b surface authenticates with the API keys it is given (apiserver.e2b.apiKeySecret).
• Node-local warm-pool claims are authorized by the sandboxd bearer token. A claimed sandbox is driven with the per-claim token handed back on create: the sandbox.cocoonstack.io/token annotation on the Kubernetes surface. The e2b surface hands out envdAccessToken instead, an HMAC of that claim token under the envd secret (apiserver.e2b.envdSecret), which the sandbox’s own envd enforces. Both are secrets: leaking one grants control over that sandbox, never over the host, and the e2b token reaches only its data plane.
• sandbox-envd-proxy holds the fleet sandboxd token and the envd secret. It reads a sandbox’s claim token from the owning node, admits a request only when the presented token derives from it, and opens the relay with the claim token, which no client ever sees. A signed file URL on 49983 is the one request it admits without a token; it relays that with the fleet token, which sandboxd keeps passive, so it never wakes a paused sandbox, and envd checks the signature. A caller never learns a node address.
• Sandboxes are hardware-isolated microVMs. A guest escape is a vulnerability in the hypervisor stack underneath, coordinated with the relevant upstream.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue. Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories — “Report a vulnerability” on the repository’s Security tab. Fixes land on master and the most recent tagged release.

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